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Abstract
 In April 2001, the generation unit of Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) was split into six subsidiary 
companies with further plans for privatization. But, the process of privatization has ceased due to changes in 
political  environment.  This  study  analyzes  the  performance  of  the  restructuring  of  generation  units  using 
financial and physical indices. The results from the analysis also show that the restructuring has had positive 
effect on their performance. The financial indices of the generation companies also show that the prices of fuels, 
intervention of government, and capability of management affect the performance of the companies. Although 
the results do not show that restructuring favorably affected the prices of electricity, the indices of liability and 
profitability show some promising signs arising from the electricity sector reform. To maintain these changes, 
further liberalization needs to be followed, although there are some issues that need to be dealt with prior to 
restructuring and privatization plans. The problems of proper reserve margin, the negative effect of regional 
electricity company, and the conflict between cost saving and preserving environment are some of those need to 
be dealt with. Those problems can be solved by institutional reform and further liberalization.            
1. Introduction
 In the past decade, the reforms in the electricity sector have speeded up and numerous reforms have proceeded. 
As  of  June  2006,  14  countries  have  completed  electricity  sector  reform programs  while  60  countries  are 
undergoing electricity sector reform programs. These countries often remodeled earlier reform models to suit 
their own needs and circumstance, and the electricity reform in Korea also proceeded in its own way. In April 
2001,  the  generation  portion  of  Korea  Electric  Power  Corporation  (KEPCO)  was  split  into  six  subsidiary 
companies: Korea South-East Power (KOSEP), Korea Midland Power (KOMIPO), Korea Western Power (WP), 
Korea  East-West  Power  (EWP),  Korea  Hydro  & Nuclear  Power  (KHNP),  and  Korea  Southern  Power  Co 
(KOSPO). This essentially meant that original KEPCO has turned into a transmission and distribution monopoly 
in Korea. 
From 1961 until April 2001, South Korea's sole electric power utility was KEPCO. Set up as a government 
corporation, 21% of its shares were sold to the public in 1989. After the currency crisis in 1997, the Korean 
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government started to make plans to privatize the electricity sector and the first step was spinning off KEPCO’s 
generation unit into six separate subsidiary companies. It was the first step of restructuring of electricity sector. 
The original plan was structured in three phases. The first step was spinning off and privatizing the generation 
sector to create a competitive electricity market (CBP: Cost Based Pool). The second phase was restructuring 
and privatizing the distribution sector to induce a two way bidding pool market. The third phase was opening the 
electricity  market  for  free  competition.  But  plans  to  privatize  generating  companies  and  the  following 
restructuring and privatization of distribution(sales) sectors were ceased when President Roh came into power in 
2003. As a result, the electricity sector reform remains as incomplete reform. Although the privatization plan is 
likely to continue with the current administration, the current market structure poses numerous problems: first is 
that  there  exists  imperfect  competition  among  the  generation  companies,  second,  the  system  leaves 
opportunistic intervention by the state, and third, there exists a conflict between cost saving and preserving 
environment.
This study seeks to analyze the performance of the current electricity system because this would provide useful 
information as to the future course of policy reform ideas. And this study also seek to identify problems with the 
market structure and find likely solutions in terms of market structure in all levels of electricity industry.
2. Background
Energy Policy in Korea
Throughout the years, the goal of Korea's energy policy has shifted from ensuring a stable supply of energy to 
achieving sustainable development, largely due to rapidly changing internal and external conditions. In order to 
maintain high economic growth in the 1970s, energy policies centered on oil, which was relatively easy and 
cheap to buy. However,  the two rounds of oil  crisis  significantly impacted the national  economy, and new 
policies  have been pursued since the 1980s to establish a  stable supply and demand system, including the 
diversification of energy supply sources and expanding the energy supply infrastructure. The diversification 
policy was to have nuclear power as a major element of electricity production and rationalization was pursued in 
the coal industry.  
From the late 1990s, restructuring of the energy sector was pursued in full-scale with the introduction of the 
principle of free competition to such utility industries as electricity and gas which had been considered natural 
monopolies.  Furthermore,  initiatives  forwarded  by  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate 
Change have strengthened environmental regulations. As a result, sustainable development has emerged as the 
focal point of Korea's recent shift in energy policy.
Electricity Market Operation System1
1 Recomposition of the information from www.kpx.co.kr
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Prior to the restructuring of the electricity industry, KEPCO used to enjoy a monopoly over power generation, 
transmission/distribution, and sales until the spinoff of its generation unit. Also, the government lifted entry 
barriers that virtually made it impossible for IPPs (Independent Power Producer) to operate in the market. The 
generation  market  structure  as  mandated  by  the  electricity  industry  restructuring  started  in  April  2001. 
Nonetheless, KEPCO remains as the sole purchaser (power sales business) of electricity. Therefore, whereas 
competition is allowed in the supply side in the current CBP market, monopoly is maintained on the demand 
side. Given its current structure, the CBP market is competitive to the extent that generators compete with each 
other. Moreover, since the Korean power system is maintained on a single national grid, there is no regional 
trading market; only a single power trading market is required to coordinate and manage energy supply and 
demand across the whole country.
The current Korean electricity system is based on the Cost-Based Pool (CBP) concept since the market price 
reflects the actual generation cost. Under the pool system, all generators are obliged to submit the details of their 
production costs which are independently checked and approved by the Generation Cost Assessment Committee 
(GCAC).  Using  this  information,  Korea  Power  Exchange  (KPX)  prepares  a  Price  Setting  Schedule  and 
calculates the marginal price (SMP) based on the principle of minimizing the system variable cost. The market 
price is composed of the system marginal price (SMP) and capacity payment (CP). Capacity payment is the 
price paid to a generating unit that has declared its availability during the day. Price cap is imposed on the 
energy price of base load generating units such as coal and nuclear energy. Marginal Price (SMP) is determined 
as the most expensive generation available for the trading period in the Price Setting Schedule. After real-time 
dispatching, settlement for the energy produced takes place based on the market price (SMP, Capacity Payment). 
Settlement = Output×SMP + Capacity×CP + Other Payment
3. Literature Review
 There are several studies on the performance of electricity sector reform. Pollitt (1997) categorizes empirical 
studies on electricity sector reform into four groups: i) ones that use financial and physical indicators; ii) ones 
that  look  at  labor  productivity  measures  or  total  factor  productivity  (TFP);  iii)  ones  that  use  frontier 
methodologies; and iv) approaches based on social cost benefit analysis of electricity privatization. 
The first method is the simplest approach. Yarrow (1992) develops a counterfactual scenario which assumes 
British  electricity  sector  had  not  been  privatized  and  compares  the  actual  results.  Branston  (2000)  further 
improves the model and conducts counterfactual price analysis on the British electricity privatization. The result 
is that the reform had minimal impact on prices. Duncan and Bollard (1992) analyze the impact of the reform of 
the government control of Electricity Corporation of New Zealand. Rocha et al. (2007) analyze the return on 
capital  of  Brazilian  electricity  distributors,  and  he  concludes  that  the  return  on  equity  in  Brazil  was 
systematically negative until 2003.  
Bishop and Thompson (1992) analyze changes in the labor or total factor productivity growth rates as a result 
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of the 1983 Energy Act which sought to introduce limited competition into the electricity generation industry. 
Haskel and Syzmanski (1992) examine the impact the implementation of divisional management structure in the 
UK ESI in 1983. Plane (1999) estimates the total factor productivity of Côte d'Ivoire Electricity Company (CIE) 
and he finds that productive efficiency improved due to privatization.
Hawdon (1996), using cross-sectional data for developing countries, finds that privatized firms in their sample 
had higher productivity efficiency. Berg and Jeong (1991) analyze the effects of the introduction of incentive 
regulation in the US and suggest that relative inefficiency is not reduced by narrow incentive regulation focused 
on  plant  utilization  and  thermal  efficiency.  Cullmann  and  Hirshhausen  (2008)  provides  a  cross-country 
efficiency analysis of electricity distribution companies in the East European transition countries of Poland , the 
Czech Republic,  Slovakia,  and Hungary. The results  suggest  that  privatization has had a positive effect  on 
technical efficiency in the four countries.
The fourth method measures the impact of privatization on the society as a whole. Jones et al. (1990) outline 
the methodology, and Galal et al. (1994) apply it to 12 privatizations. Newbery and Pollitt (1997) applied the 
methodology to the privatization case of Britain’s CEGB. Oliveira et al. (2004) measure the gains and loses of 
shareholders, board members, fuel suppliers, consultants, equipment suppliers, service-providers, consumers, 
government, and regulators created by the British ESI regulatory system. They conclude that the reform is 
overall benefitial,  although not for stakeholders.  Toba (2007) measure the welfare impacts of the electricity 
generation sector reform in the Philippines. The results show that consumers and investors are net gainers, while 
the government lost due to loss of revenue while and environment lost due to increased pollution.  
4. Theoretical Framework
This study uses various financial statements of KEPCO and the price of electricity to analyze the impact of the 
restructuring  program.  A social  cost  benefit  analysis  tends  to  better  evaluate  the  overall  aspects  of  the 
performance; however, it is hard to apply to partial electricity industry reform cases. And the analysis of labor 
productivity is not adequate in this case because labor productivity is often affected by the total number of labor 
(the labors in KEPCO are transferred to the generation companies). Therefore, it is more suitable to use financial 
and physical indicators in this case. 
First, this study analyzes the financial statement of electricity companies to look the performances of each 
company. Then, this study examines the effect of electricity restructuring in Korea on the electricity companies’ 
financial indicators and electricity price. 
Analysis of Financial Statements2 
 Financial statements are the starting point of analysis as they report data about income, cash flows, and assets 
and liabilities that users can tailor to their specific needs. Financial reports often contain supplementary data 
2 Recomposition of White et al. (2003)
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that, although not included in the statements themselves, enable users to interpret the financial status of the 
organization in question or to make adjustment of corporate performance (such as financial ratios) to make them 
more comparable, consistent over time, and more representative of economic reality. The common aspects that 
assess a company’s financial status are liability, profitability, and growth.
    
Analysis of Liability. A firm’s liabilities is crucial to the analysis of its long-run viability and growth. A firm 
can incur obligations in various ways; some are a result of the firm’s operating activities, whereas others results 
from its financing decisions. The former are characterized by exchanges of goods and services for the later 
payment  of cash (or vice versa),  whereas debts arising from financing decisions generally involves  current 
receipts of cash in exchange for later payments of cash. Both forms of debts are generally reported on the 
balance sheet. 
Liability can be estimated by the current ratio3 and the debt ratio4. Lenders and creditors assess the ability of a 
firm to meet its current obligations. That ability depends on the cash resources available as of the balance sheet 
date and the cash to be generated through the operating cycle of firm.  Current ratio compares levels of cash 
resources  with current  liabilities  as  the  measure  of  cash  obligation. Long-term debt  and  solvency  analysis 
evaluates the level of risk borne by a firm, changes over time, and risk relative to comparable investments. A 
higher proportion of debt relative to equity increases the riskiness of the firm.  
 Analysis  of  Profitability. Equity  investors  are  concerned  with  the  firm’s  ability  to  generate,  sustain,  and 
increase profits. Profitability can be measured in several different ways. First, the return on investment (ROI) 
measures  profits  to  the  investment  required  to  generate  them.  Return  on  investment  (ROI)  measures  the 
relationship between profits and investment required to generate them. The ratio on profits to sale residual 
returns to the firm per sales dollar. 
 The return on assets (ROA)5 compares income with total assets. It can be interpreted in two ways. First, it 
measures management’s ability and efficiency in using the firm’s assets to generate profits. Second, it reports 
the total return accruing to all providers of capital, independent of the source of capital. The return on total 
stockholders’ equity (ROE)6 excludes debt in the denominator and uses either pretax income (after interest costs) 
or net income. Both ROA and ROE reflect the firm’s capital structure. Creditors and shareholders provide the 
capital needed by the firm to acquire the assets used in the business. In return, they receive their share of the 
firm’s profits. ROA measure returns to all providers of capital. ROE measures returns to the firm’s shareholder 
and is calculated after deducting the returns paid to creditors (interest). The equity shareholder can earn higher 
returns  by  “leveraging”  the  investment  provided  by  the  debt  holders  as  long  as  the  returns  earned  by  the 
company’s assets (ROA) are greater than the cost of debt. Operating margin7 is the relationship between the 
firm’s costs and its sales. The ability to control costs in relation to revenues enhances earnings power.
3 Current Ratio = Current Assets/Current Liabilities
4 Debt Ratio = Total Debt/Total Equity
5 ROA = Net Income/Average Total Assets
6 ROE = Net Income/Average Stockholders’ Equity
7 Operating Margin = Operating Profit/Sales
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 Analysis  of  Growth. Analysis  of  growth  premises  a  long-term  management  plan.  The  analysis  offers 
information about future income, sales, costs, and profit for a long-term management plan. Growth ratio shows 
that the company’s ability to take the chance of growing, and it represents the company’s competiveness are 
maintained well. In other words, the ratio is used to decide whether the status of the company is sustainable or 
not. The indices are consist of growth rate of sales8, growth rate of operating profit9, growth rate of net income10, 
and growth rate of assets11. 
Analysis of the Effect of Electricity Reform
 We also conduct regression analysis with dummy variables. The dependent variables included are price and 
financial indicators and a dummy variable which is 1 periods after the reform of electricity sector. Independent 
variables are also taken from earlier studies.
Yarrow (1992) conducted a price analysis to examine the performance of the British electricity privatization. 
And,  Branston  (2000)  renewed  the  methodology  and  executed  a  counterfactual  price  analysis  of  British 
electricity privatization. Branston’s approach is similar to that of Yarrow where the cost of electricity has been 
split into the three components shown in Equation (1):
        (1)
where   is the relevant price (per kWh) of electricity in year  t;   the ‘fossil fuel costs’ per unit (kWh) of 
electricity sold in year t; and  comprises ‘non-fossil fuel costs’ (per kWh) in year t; and  the ‘profits’  (per 
kWh) in year  t.  This model is  also suitable for  the examination of  the Korean electricity reform since the 
proportion of nuclear generation is high in Korea. And there is an implicit profit regulation in KEPCO. As a 
result, there are three independent variables which are , , and . 
 Equation (1) uses the weighted unit cost of coal, gas, and oil generated electricity to calculate an estimate of 
cost of fossil fuels per unit of fossil fuel generated electricity. However, Equation (1) does not take into account 
the electricity generated from other, non-fossil fuel sources such as nuclear or hydro. But, Equation (2) takes 
into account of this.
8 Growth Rate of Sales = (Current Sales–Last year’s Sales)/Last year’s Sales
9 Growth  Rate  of  Operating  Profit  =  (Current  Operating  Profit-Last  year’s  Operating  Profit)/Last  year’s 
Operating Profit
10 Growth Rate of Net Income = (Current Net Income-Last year’s Net Income)/Last year’s Net Income
11 Growth Rate of Assets = (Current Assets-Last year’s Assets)/Last year’s Assets
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           (2)
where  is the fossil fuel costs per unit (kWh) of electricity sold in year t which was generated using fossil 
fuels;  the proportion of electricity sold in year t, generated using coal;  the unit (per kWh) fuel cost of coal 
generated electricity in year t;  the proportion of electricity sold in year t, generated using gas;  the unit (per 
kWh) fuel cost of gas generated electricity in year  t;   the proportion of electricity sold in year  t, generated 
using oil; and  is the unit (per kWh) fuel cost of electricity generated using oil in year t.
 To calculate the unit fuel cost of electricity generated from the different fossil fuels, the formula Yarrow and 
Branston used can be applied to each of the fuels:
                                                               (3)
where  is the unit fuel cost of electricity generated using fossil fuel i in year t;   the unit price of fuel i in 
year t;  the quantity of the fuel i used in year t; and  is the quantity of electricity generated using fuel i in 
year t. Equation (4) is then used to calculated the costs of the fossil fuels per unit all the electricity sold and not 
just the costs of the fossils fuels per unit of electricity generated by those fossil fuels, as was carried out in 
Equation (2):
                                                              (4)
where  is the fossil costs per unit (kWh) of electricity sold in year t;   the fossil costs per unit (kWh) of 
electricity sold in year t which was generated using fossil fuels;  the number of units of electricity (kWh) 
sold in year t which was generated using fossil fuels; and  is the number of units of electricity (kWh) sold 
in year t.
 Although this study doesn’t conduct counterfactual analysis, these equations are useful for converting data. 
Without these converting procedures, fuel cost’s effect can be overestimated to dependant variables. 
5. Analysis of Financial Statements
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 The financial statements provide information about the performance of each generation company. We conduct 
both the analysis of liability, profitability, and growth of each company as well as the generating units as a 
whole. 
    
Analysis of Liability
Current Ratio. The ideal current ratio is said to be above 200%. If KHNP is excluded (KHNP has different 
scale from the other generation companies), the current ratios range from 31% to 112% (See Fig. 1 and Table 4). 
Although the ratios are low to the industry standard, it does not mean that the companies are at a risk since they 
receive a stable cash revenue from KEPCO in the current system. 
Debt Ratio. The ideal debt ratio is said to be under 100%. The debt ratios range from 32% to 139% (See Fig. 2 
and Table 5). They have a stable debt although the ratios are on the rise due to new constructions of power 
plants. 
Figure  1.  Current  Ratios  of  the  generation 
companies                          (Unit: %)            
Figure  2.  Debt  Ratios  of  the  Generation 
Companies     (Unit: %)
The liabilities of the generation companies are well managed under the current system. But the current ratios 
are likely to improve with the future structural reform as they need to pay more attention to their financial 
structure in the competitive markets. 
Analysis of Profitability
 ROA. We found that ROAs are usually lower than those of other industries. The average ROA of the generation 
companies ranges between 3% to 7%, and the average for the last 3 years near 4% (See Fig. 3 and Table 6). It is 
extraordinary  to  find  their  ROAs  under  5%.  It  is  expected  their  ROAs  will  improve  due  to  increased 
depreciation in the future. 
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ROE. ROE is an important summary measure of a firm’s profitability and the return on investment. It captures 
many  facets  of  a  firm’s  operating,  investment,  and  financing  characteristics.  Given  its  importance,  it  is 
worthwhile  asking  whether  current  ROE can  be  used  to  forecast  future  ROE levels.  A related  question is 
whether abnormally high levels of profitability can be expected to continue into the future.  Penman (1991) 
provides some insight into these questions: (i) in the short term, approximating five years (except for extreme 
portfolios), current levels of ROE persist into the future; (ii) over the long term, ROEs tend to revert toward an 
average “economicwide” ROE.; (iii) although there is a trend toward the mean, the portfolio rankings persist. 
That is, the portfolios with higher (lower) ROE tend to have higher (lower) ROEs in the future, however, the 
differences between the portfolios narrow.
Figure 3. ROAs of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
Figure 4. ROEs of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
The ROEs of the generation companies move in similar patterns as shown in the above (See Fig. 4 and Table 7). 
ROEs varied much during five years, and it shows a steady up swing movement recently. But the ROEs of EWP 
and KOSEP are even lower than the base rates. These firms need to improve their efficiency for future course of 
action.
Figure  5.  Operating  Margins  of  the  Generation 
Companies
(Unit: %)
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Operating Margin. Operating margin is an index that 
shows  the  profitability  of  operating  capital.  The 
operating margins of 5 companies using fossil fuels 
sharply decreased in 2004 due to the electricity price 
decrease (see Fig. 5 and Table 8). The reason for the 
price  decrease  is  that  the  operating  profit  of  the 
electricity company was high in 2003. The price of 
electricity is decided by government which takes into 
account the operating profit of electricity companies, 
interest rate, and capital cost. 
In terms of overall trend, the operating margins are 
decreasing continuously with the increasing price of 
fuels  after  2004.  On  the  contrary,  the  operation 
margin  of  KHNP has  remained  high,  because  the 
price of uranium were kept low.
Analysis of Growth
Growth Rate of Sales. Growth rate of sales is also important index to assess a company’s growth potential. 
But, it is not critical index to generation companies because the demand of electricity is often determined by the 
growth of national economy.  Although it has less importance in electricity companies, growth rate of sales gives 
much information. It is possible to estimate the investment, efficiency, and competency of the company with the 
index.
The reason that the growth rates of sales decreased sharply in 2003 (See Fig. 6 and Table 9) is the sales data in 
2001 covers only 9 months after the restructuring. And the rates are fluctuating with constructions of power 
plants since then. This index is more important with the investment and privatization plan.
Growth Rates of Operating Profit. This index also needs to be careful interpreted for electricity companies in 
Korea,  because the price of electricity is  determined by the government considering the operating profit  of 
electricity companies. Same as the operating margins in 2004, the growth rates of operating profit have negative 
values in 2004 (See Fig. 7 and Table 10).  And the reason that the rates sharply decreased was the same as that 
of growth rate of sales. The rates are fluctuating by the change of fuel and electricity prices.
Growth Rate of Net Income. Growth rates of net income moved similarly to the rates of operating profit (See 
Fig. 8 and Table 11). But, we need to pay closer attention to the growth rate of net income of KOSPO. The every 
growth rates of net income of KOSPO is positive value except in 2004. The reason is that KOSPO has new 
power plants with high efficiency and the management of the company is effective. 
Figure 6. Growth Rates of Sales of the Generation Company                           (Unit: %)
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Figure 7. Growth Rates of Operating Profit of the 
Generation Company         (Unit: %)
Growth Rate of Total Assets. Growth rate of total assets shows the growth of the investment. The growth rates 
of total assets of the generation companies are also fluctuating by the changes of the fuel prices (See Fig. 9 and 
Table 12). But the growth rate of total assets of KOSEP is increasing sharply since the construction of new 
power plants. The total growth rate of total assets should be maintained continuously, because it is needed to 
catch the increasing electricity demand. To escape a power shortage, the plan should be made and invested five 
years ahead.  
   
Figure  8.  Growth  Rates  of  Net  Income  of  the 
Generation Company (Unit: %)
Figure  9.  Growth  Rates  of  Total  Assets  of  the 
Generation Company (Unit: %)
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 In summary, the price of fuels and the price of electricity have big impact on the generation companies. The 
increase  of  fuel  price  burdens  the  operating  of  the  companies,  and  government  influences  the  generation 
companies’ profit  by  setting  the  price  of  electricity.  But,  the  effects  are  varied  by  companies’ operating 
efficiency and the equipments they have.  
7. Analysis of the Impact of the Electricity Reform
Method
 To analyze the impact of the electricity restructuring on the efficiency of electricity industry, several indices are 
used  in  this  analysis.  In  the  model  I,  the  price  of  electricity  is  used  as  the  dependent  variable,  and  the 
independent variables include the price of fossil fuel, the price of non-fossil fuel, the profit of KEPCO, and the 
electricity reform. The last independent variable is set as a dummy variable that reveals the impact of electricity 
restructuring. All units of the data are US cent/kWh, and the prices of fuels are transformed by the equations in 
the section of theoretical framework, and the period of analysis is from 1997 to 2006. 
In the model II, the financial indices are used as the dependent variable, and the independent variables include 
the price of fossil fuel, price of non-fossil fuel, and electricity restructuring. The financial indices are calculated 
from  consolidated  financial  statements  of  KEPCO  which  contains  financial  information  about  generation 
companies. We analyze the data for a period from 1997 to 2006.  
In the model III, the price of electricity is added to the independent variables of Model II, and the dependent 
variables are the same. The price of electricity affect the financial indices since it influences the profits of these 
companies. The price of electricity needs to be controlled, because it is determined by the government. This 
model detects the impact of the restructuring excluding the effect from the electricity price changes.
Analysis of Results
 The result of model I shows that the impact of the electricity reform is not significant in terms of the price of 
electricity. This can be interpreted in two ways. One is the price setting of government blocked the impact of 
electricity reform. The other is that the price could be already at a optimal level. 
        
Table 1. Results of Model I 
Dependent 
variable
β t value p-value R2 Adj-R2 F Value Pr > F
Price of 
electricity
-0.44389 -0.41 0.6955 0.7298 0.5947 5.4 0.0385
Notes: The independent variables are price of fossil fuel, price of non-fossil fuel, profit, and electricity restructuring. β is the 
estimated coefficient of the dummy variable, electricity restructuring. The independent variables are standardized. 
12
 The results of model II are slight different. The current ratio has had positive impacts from the restructuring. It 
shows that current ratio has increased since the restructuring. And debt ratio has had a positive impact too. The 
debt ratio has decreased since the electricity reform. The index of liability has improved. It seems that KEPCO 
tried to enhance its liability preparing for the further liberalization. 
The indices of profitability also have positive value. ROA and operating profit have significant results while 
ROE remain insignificant. The ROA and operating profit increased sharply after the restructuring (See Fig. 12 
and Table 13), but the ratios decreased due to the price increase of fuel since 2004. If the effect of price increase 
is  eliminated,  the  impact  of  electricity  reform  is  positive  in  terms  of  profitability.  This  implies  that  the 
restructuring brought about some positive impacts on the efficiency of the companies’ operation. 
The growth rate  of  sales  and growth rate  of  total  asset  are the significant  indices  among growth indices. 
Growth rate of sales of electricity is affected by the economic growth, so the result does not have substantial  
meaning in this study. Also, growth rate of total asset has a negative impact of the restructuring. That means the 
reform of electricity industry gave negative impact on the investment. 
 
       
Table 2. Results of Model II
Dependent 
variable
β t value p-value R2 Adj-R2 F Value Pr > F
CRa*** 17.4158 5.1 0.0014 0.9754 0.9684 138.73 <.0001
DRb* -44.4345 -2.27 0.0576 0.5907 0.4738 5.05 0.0439
ROA** 1.36965 2.69 0.031 0.5396 0.408 4.1 0.0662
ROE 1.96893 1.84 0.1085 0.3296 0.1381 1.72 0.2467
OMc*** 5.99062 5.08 0.0014 0.8516 0.8092 20.09 0.0013
GRSd** -6.52656 -2.64 0.0333 0.5572 0.4307 4.4 0.0578
GROPe -7.3385 -0.86 0.4186 0.6811 0.59 7.48 0.0183
GRNIf 1.22026 0.04 0.9709 0.1913 -0.0398 0.83 0.4756
GRTAg* -14.5186 -1.93 0.0951 0.3955 0.2228 2.29 0.1717
Notes:  The independent variables are price of fossil  fuel,  price of non-fossil  fuel,  and electricity restructuring.  β is the 
estimated coefficient of the dummy variable, electricity restructuring. The independent variables are standardized.
Significance Levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a. Current Ratio. b. Debt Ratio. c. Operating Margin. d. Growth Rate of Sales. e. Growth Rate of Operating Profit. f. Growth 
Rate of Net Income. g. Growth Rate of Total Asset.  
 The results of model III also have some significant outcomes. Although the debt ratio is no more significant, the 
liability of the company is still improved. That means the reform still affected positively on the liability of the 
company when the effect from the price changes of electricity is excluded.
The ROA is still  significant at the 90% significance level, and the operating margin is significant at 99% 
significance level.  The ROA’s  significance level  is  decreaed,  because the increases  of  electricity  price  can 
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explain the changes of profit. However, the restructuring still has a positive effect on the profitability of the 
company. The indices of growth are insignificant except the growth rate of sales. But it  is also not easy to 
conclude  the  reform  has  not  affected  the  indices  of  growth.  The  indices  of  growth  should  be  monitored 
continuously.
Table 3. Results of Model III
Dependent 
variable
β t value p-value R2 Adj-R2 F Value Pr > F
CRa*** 16.98836 4.42 0.0045 0.9759 0.9639 81.01 <.0001
DRb -34.2606 -1.92 0.1027 0.7382 0.6073 5.64 0.0352
ROA* 1.10798 2.38 0.0545 0.7023 0.5534 4.72 0.0508
ROE 1.40793 1.45 0.196 0.5756 0.3634 2.71 0.1378
OMc*** 5.88485 4.42 0.0045 0.8532 0.7799 11.63 0.0065
GRSd* -5.96425 -2.2 0.0699 0.5878 0.3817 2.85 0.1271
GROPe -5.36653 -0.57 0.587 0.7039 0.5558 4.75 0.0501
GRNIf -8.19882 -0.24 0.8205 0.283 -0.0754 0.79 0.5423
GRTAg -11.7551 -1.52 0.1799 0.5044 0.2566 2.04 0.2105
Notes:  The  independent  variables  are  price  of  fossil  fuel,  price  of  non-fossil  fuel,  price  of  electricity,  and  electricity 
restructuring. β is the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable, electricity restructuring. The independent variables are 
standardized.
Significance Levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a. Current Ratio. b. Debt Ratio. c. Operating Margin. d. Growth Rate of Sales. e. Growth Rate of Operating Profit. f. Growth 
Rate of Net Income. g. Growth Rate of Total Asset.  
In  conclusion,  the reform of  electricity  did not  benefit  consumers  since  price  is  tightly  controlled  by the 
government but it brought some positive effects on generating companies. The liability indices worsened due to 
increased uncertainty, and some indices of profitability are also improved by the restructuring. The indices of 
growth have a negative effect.
8. Current Issues for Further Liberalization 
Imperfect Competition among the Generation companies
KEPCO was split into six generation companies including KNHP and they produce 95% of electricity in Korea 
(See Table 16). They are competing with each other in oligopoly market structure with the price setting by 
government. The low level of competition and government intervention are causing some inefficiencies (as the 
result of the analyses in section 6 & 7). Also, there are some indications that they are collaborating with each 
other since the current reserve margin is too low (See Table 17). If the reserve margin is too low, an oligopoly 
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company can use oligopoly power more easily. Almost all  countries that went through successful electricity 
reform had a reserve margins above 20% (Toda (2005)), but current reserve margin of electricity in Korea is 
only 7.2%. 
However, it is also hard to compare the current margin to those of before, because the scale of electricity 
capacity is different. Maintaining 20% of reserve margin will cause excessive waste in the current electricity 
market. So, it is needed to study adequate reserve margin that doesn’t cause over usage of oligopoly power and 
excessive waste.       
Regional Electricity Company’s Problems in Distorted price system
   
 Regional electricity company is the company that has the privilege of general electricity company within the 
specific region where the company can supply more than 70% of the regional electricity demand. In this case, 
the company can escape the compulsory pool and uniform price. This aspect can reduce electricity price, save 
transmission cost,  and improve the plant  efficiency when the plant  is  combined cycle.  But  there are more 
negative  effects  of  regional  electricity  company  in  Korea.  The  pricing  structure  of  electricity  in  Korea  is 
cumulative that  the maximum rate  is  11 times higher  than the minimum rate,  and that  causes severe cross 
subsidization. In this case, if a regional electricity company buys electricity at low price and sells the electricity 
at high price, then other regions consumers have disadvantage (See Fig. 10).
Figure 10. Cross Subsidization under a Regional Electricity Company  
Note: Regional electricity companies usually supply the electricity only to general and apartment
 And, there are the problem of duplicated equipment and the problem of meeting the demand. The former 
transmission/distribution  equipment  is  useless  when  a  new  regional  electricity  company  constructs  new 
equipment, and a regional electricity company is hard to meet the demand due to lack of risk absorbing ability. 
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To prevent these problems, the standard of supply capacity should be reinforced. A regional electricity company 
should generate near 100% of the regional electricity demand, and it need to grant a permission with expiration. 
Also, government should provide some incentive to share transmission/distribution equipment.  
.
Conflict between Cost saving and Preserving environment
 To save fuel costs and ultimately reduce the price of electricity in the long term, the regulators need to expand 
the base load generators. Base load generation includes units such as coal and nuclear energy. The cost of base 
load tends to ne much lower than the cost of other generating units, and the price of current pricing system 
reflects critically which generator has generated the last unit of electricity. So, the proportion of base load is the 
key factor of electricity reform. But the scale of the investment is much bigger than that of other generating 
units. It means that the regulatory need to confer more structured incentive to increase the investment of base 
load.
 However, this needs to be balanced by the environmental factors as base load units tend to serious harm the 
environment. Also, the Kyoto protocol urges nations to reduce emission of greenhouse gases from 2008. This 
implies that cost saving issues and environmental considerations should be taken into account when making 
short- and long-term investment plans: perhaps we can maintain the current proportion of base load in the short-
term while investing more on alternative energy sources in the long-term. The cost of alternative energy is high 
at this point, but it will likely decrease as the technologies evolve. 
9. Summary and Limitations
 This study analyzed the overall impact of the electricity reform in Korea, and reviewed the current issues on the 
electricity sector in Korea. The analysis of financial statements showed that the price of fuels and the price of 
electricity affected the performance of generation companies. It is hard to expect the operation of companies 
will improve much without privatization, because the intervention of government prevents the electricity market 
from full market competition. 
We found that the restructuring program has had different impact on generating companies. Depending on the 
competency of the management, companies have responded differently to the reform program. In making this 
type  of  statement,  we  need  to  carefully  take  into  account  the  different  investment  and  management 
characteristics of each generating units.
 The  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  electricity  reform generally  showed  a  positive.  Although  the  price  of 
electricity has not fallen significantly, the liability and profitability indices showed positive changes. It appears 
that the intervention of government reduced the effect of restructuring on the price of electricity. The indices of 
profitability (especially ROA and operating margin) have shown a positive effect from the electricity reform. In 
sum, ROA (increased 1.1% at model III) and operating margin (increased 5.9% at model III) improved after the 
restructuring. We have found that generating companies were successful in reducing their operating cost. 
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In addition, the growth potential of these companies declined, although it is hard to interpret that the effect is 
substantial since the data has an outlier. Also, the decrease in the growth rate of assets means the decrease of 
investment. If the investment shrinks, then the depreciation cost is reduced and the profit is increased. That 
caused the improvement of indexes of profitability. Decrease of investment is also a factor of electricity price 
increase in future, and the trend of the indices of profitability is returning to the previous level. These all mean 
that the impact of restructuring can be negative in the long-term. Therefore it  is needed to improve current 
system continuously.  
For further liberalization, there are several  problems in the electricity market  in Korea.  Current electricity 
market in Korea is oligopoly. There are many possibilities that the structure could cause critical problems in 
future.  The  generation  companies  can  use  their  oligopoly  power  because  the  electricity  reserve  margin  is 
currently quite low. It is quite hard to decide which reserve margin is optimal for the future, but it should be 
studied further. 
The  regional  electricity  company  is  causing  numerous  problems  under  the  distorted  pricing  system.  The 
cumulative pricing system enable policy makers to cross subsidize each other causing severe misallocation of 
resources. These problems can only be solved by the institutional level changes.
In addition, we need more discussion on the optimal level of based loads and the future course of action sicne 
there are trade-offs  involved in  terms of  cost  saving and environmental  costs.  We need  to  be  smart  about 
designing incentive for future investment in generating units as it has future implications on not only costs but 
also environmental issues. 
The impact of the electricity reform is hard to estimate because it  affects several  entities in a number of 
different areas. This study is based financial and physical analysis of six generating units that were spinned off 
from the state  monopoly unit  of  KEPCO and there  are many areas  this  study did not  take  into account. 
Although the best way to compare the states of before and after is to count direct costs and benefits, we had 
virtually little data to work with. Therefore, it is hard to decide only with the result of this analysis, but it gives 
some reference for further studies. 
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Table 4. Current Ratios of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KOSEP 62.15 30.96 57.37 64.27 75.15 88.64 68.31 
KOMIPO 63.60 56.53 91.13 80.15 98.43 83.12 83.85 
WP 72.72 129.08 132.22 114.01 126.76 101.96 111.81 
KOSPO 52.85 37.76 48.40 69.20 89.44 101.50 74.77 
EWP 65.62 79.01 57.81 60.84 124.43 103.36 101.16 
KHNP 54.18 83.85 122.65 160.60 274.33 438.35 370.32 
Table 5. Debt Ratios of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KOSEP 98.49 78.71 68.30 79.96 78.75 96.21 138.93 
KOMIPO 98.92 66.14 31.64 40.88 40.84 46.93 66.37 
WP 105.42 79.36 52.80 44.46 48.42 61.09 60.13 
KOSPO 110.22 86.40 84.57 67.91 61.21 52.93 61.57 
EWP 107.95 82.56 66.53 64.62 73.52 75.76 83.13 
KHNP 105.36 88.63 83.07 71.37 69.98 66.95 72.01 
Table 6. ROAs of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KOSEP 6.10 10.80 11.02 4.41 2.98 2.06 1.86 
KOMIPO 5.41 11.10 12.34 7.09 6.84 4.93 4.79 
WP 4.12 7.25 8.13 5.35 5.79 4.58 4.60 
KOSPO 0.42 3.95 4.96 2.63 3.00 5.74 5.82 
EWP -0.58 1.62 2.17 2.32 2.40 1.02 0.73 
KHNP 2.80 4.11 3.35 3.90 4.69 3.51 3.44 
Table 7. ROEs of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KOSEP 12.10 20.26 19.07 7.68 5.34 3.87 4.05 
KOMIPO 10.76 20.10 18.17 9.67 9.63 7.09 7.51 
WP 8.45 13.89 13.44 7.95 8.48 7.09 7.39 
KOSPO 0.87 7.81 9.20 4.64 4.94 9.01 9.15 
EWP -1.20 3.15 3.79 3.84 4.06 1.78 1.31 
KHNP 5.76 8.07 6.23 6.90 8.00 5.90 5.83 
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Table 8. Operating Margins of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KOSEP 19.37 29.57 32.52 13.77 10.56 7.16 7.93 
KOMIPO 25.85 28.96 28.92 16.33 13.00 8.04 10.61 
WP 15.70 19.81 20.09 12.67 11.48 9.34 8.61 
KOSPO 7.46 14.13 16.43 6.85 6.53 8.56 8.95 
EWP 3.18 10.35 11.81 7.41 6.37 3.70 3.64 
KHNP 26.62 24.70 22.85 22.39 23.90 18.64 18.43 
Table 9. Growth Rates of Sales of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KOSEP 30.40 1.86 10.95 24.55 -1.22 7.75 
KOMIPO 56.27 11.62 6.27 16.63 11.76 12.68 
WP 36.95 6.05 -3.59 8.23 8.85 26.61 
KOSPO 37.49 12.53 34.62 4.72 16.20 12.66 
EWP 35.03 1.95 8.07 4.94 18.41 12.29 
KHNP 42.01 9.28 0.08 10.86 -1.21 -0.94 
Table 10. Growth Rates of Operating Profit of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KOSEP 99.10 12.04 -53.04 -4.45 -33.03 19.30 
KOMIPO 75.06 11.48 -40.00 -7.17 -30.88 48.78 
WP 72.84 7.55 -39.20 -1.92 -11.47 16.71 
KOSPO 160.26 30.89 -43.86 -0.23 52.29 17.87 
EWP 339.35 16.27 -32.13 -9.91 -31.20 10.51 
KHNP 31.76 1.11 -1.91 18.31 -22.95 -2.04 
Table 11. Growth Rates of Net Income of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KOSEP 84.06 13.40 -56.04 -30.62 -26.47 7.20 
KOMIPO 104.37 8.04 -40.71 5.42 -22.22 11.14 
WP 76.39 9.61 -36.35 12.18 -11.63 9.54 
KOSPO 829.20 26.76 -47.45 9.50 93.80 9.02 
EWP 23.61 3.51 8.71 -55.34 -26.03 
KHNP 46.16 -18.01 19.65 25.36 -23.36 1.39 
Table 12. Growth Rates of Total Assets of the Generation Companies
(Unit: %)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KOSEP 7.91 13.99 6.18 -0.37 12.51 25.14 
KOMIPO -0.74 -4.91 11.54 7.35 8.54 19.88 
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WP 0.13 -4.54 -2.05 9.64 13.65 4.78 
KOSPO -4.15 6.22 -7.95 0.42 2.23 12.98 
EWP -9.23 -6.61 0.59 9.58 1.17 4.93 
KHNP -0.42 1.26 4.25 4.55 0.47 6.10 
Figure 11. Liability Indices of KEPCO
(Unit: %)
Table 13. Liability Indices of KEPCO
(Unit: %)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Current 
Ratio
39.4 40.7 31.6 34.9 57.9 51.2 60.0 72.3 98.2 102.0 100.0
Debt Ratio 173.9 171.8 113.6 105.7 112.7 95.5 89.8 81.4 76.5 83.3 87.3
Figure 12. Profitability Indices of KEPCO
(Unit: %)
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Table 14. Profitability Indices of KEPCO
(Unit: %)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
ROA 1.4 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.4 4.3 3.3 4.0 3.2 2.9 1.8
ROE 3.4 6.4 6.0 4.8 5.0 8.9 6.3 7.4 5.8 5.2 3.3
Operating 
Margin
14.9 16.4 16.3 18.5 19.7 23.6 22.9 18.6 15.4 12.4 9.7
Figure 13. Growth Indices of KEPCO
(Unit: %)
Table 15. Growth Indices of KEPCO
(Unit: %)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Growth Rate 
of Sales
13.7 7.7 10.7 18.8 8.1 5.6 6.6 5.2 6.2 7.7 6.3
Growth Rate 
of Operating 
Profit
19.0 18.3 10.3 34.9 15.0 26.5 3.5 -14.5 -12.2 -13.4 -16.9
Growth Rate 
of Net 
Income
-3.3 96.1 27.6 0.4 10.4 87.2 -24.2 24.1 -16.5 -7.6 -35.9
Growth Rate 
of Total 
Assets
31.0 6.4 27.3 1.8 7.0 -0.1 1.7 2.7 1.5 6.0 4.7
Feature 14. Average Prices of Electricity
(Unit: Won/kWh)
Table 16. Prices of Fuels
(Unit: US$/ton)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
LNG 197.8 146.8 165.3 259.6 250.7 226.1 259.1 295.8 387.0 472.8
Hard Coal 51.3 45.6 40.4 35.3 37.9 38.2 38.1 54.8 93.9 79.6
Soft Coal 47.2 42.5 36.5 34.1 34.9 34.9 34.7 54.0 69.3 66.3
Oil 18.2 12.2 17.3 26.2 22.9 23.8 26.8 33.6 49.3 59.6
Uranium($/Kg) 5.6 4.2 3.3 3.9 5.2 5.8 6.5 9.1 11.7 12.0
Table 17. Generation Capacity by Company
(As of DEC 2006)
KOSEP KOMIPO WP KOSPO EWP KHNP Others
Capacity (MW) 43,609 39,249 38,447 48,578 42,520 149,902 18,875
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The Component 
ratio (%)
11.44 10.30 10.09 12.74 11.15 39.33 4.95
Table 18. Supply of Electricity in Korea
(Unit : 10MW)
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Peak Demand 3,228 3,585 3,300 3,729 4,101 4,313 4,577 4,739 5,126 5,463 5,899 6,229
Growth Rate 
(%)
8 11.1 -8 13 10 5.2 6.1 3.5 8.2 6.6 8 5.6
Installed 
Capacity
3,572 4,053 4,326 4,443 4,788 4,963 5,280 5,608 5,913 6,174 6,478 6,720
Available 
Capability
3,430 3,845 3,793 4,342 4,608 4,870 5,211 5,549 5,753 6,082 6,518 6,678
Reserve 201 260 493 613 507 557 634 810 626 619 619 449
Reserve 
Margin (%)
6.2 7.3 14.9 16.4 12.4 12.9 13.9 17.1 12.2 11.3 10.5 7.2
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